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The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that trade openness causes the skill premium to 
increase in skill-abundant developed countries, and to decrease in skill-scarce developing 
countries. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the skill premium declined in some 
developing countries, while others experienced an increase in wage inequality. This paper 
develops a North-South model, where firms produce a low-skilled and a high-skilled 
intensive good. The production of a unit of either good involves a continuum of L-tasks and 
H-tasks. The L-tasks can be performed by low-skilled workers, and the H-tasks can be 
performed by high-skilled workers. The Northern firms can produce the task in their 
headquarters, or offshore the task to the South. The results of the model suggest there is a 
threshold skill abundance level in the South, above which countries experience an increase 
in the skill premium after an improvement in the offshoring technology, and below which 
countries experience a decrease in the skill premium. The same pattern occurs with an 
improvement in the offshoring technology of tasks in the high-skilled and the low-skilled 
intensive industries. If wages in local production catch up with wages in the offshoring 
sector, offshoring does not impact wage inequality at a certain level of skill abundance. A 
threshold estimation, on 29 developing countries over the period 1982-2000, shows that 
there is a statistically significant skill abundance threshold, below which the coefficient on 
the relationship between offshoring and wage inequality is negative, and above which there 
is no impact of offshoring on wage inequality. Similar results are reached if offshoring is 
replaced by variables that proxy for the offshoring technology. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The significance of international offshoring and fragmentation of production has 
been growing around the world in recent years. Firms are subcontracting an 
ever-increasing proportion of their activities, such as the production of intermediate 
inputs, services, and most recently - specific tasks. The flourishing ease with which 
hundreds of diverse activities and tasks could be offshored to a distant location 
nowadays, has prompted amplifying research in domestic and international outsourcing 
issues. One important aspect of these new trends in globalization, is the impact on the 
skill premia in both the country-source of offshoring, and the country-host. Naturally, 
the major part of current research has been focused on the consequences of these 
outsourcing activities in various parts of the world, including developing countries 
endowed with predominantly cheap labor, upon the labor in developed countries. The 
patterns of skill premia in the diverse developing world have attracted relatively less 
attention. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the theoretical and empirical analysis 
of the patterns of wage inequality in developing countries. 
In this context, the 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that trade openness 
induces countries to export the good that intensively uses the relatively abundant factor 
of production, and import the good that intensively uses the relatively scarce factor of 
production. Accordingly, skill-abundant developed countries are expected to export the 
good that intensively uses high-skilled workers. This leads to an increase in the relative 
price of the high-skilled intensive good, a rise in the relative demand for high-skilled 
workers, and consequently an increase in the skill premium. On the other hand, 
skill-scarce developing countries are expected to export the good that intensively uses 
low-skilled workers. This leads to an increase in the relative price of the low-skilled 
intensive good, a rise in the relative demand for low-skilled workers, and consequently a 
decrease in the skill premium. Theoretical predictions, however, are not supported by the 
observed empirical evidence. Some developing countries experienced an increase in the 
skill premium, while others witnessed a decline after trade openness. Evidence as to the 
asymmetric patterns of skill premia in the developing countries is documented by 
Freeman and Oostendorp (2001), Hanson and Harrison (1995), Robbins (1996), Wood 
(1997), and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004). 
As this poses a challenge to trade theorists, some studies have attempted to address 
this puzzle in order to resolve the discrepancies between the predictions of the theory 
and the empirical evidence. The first stream attributes the increase in the skill premium 
in the South to outsourcing and technology transfer. For instance, Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996) argue that outsourcing shifts a portion of input production from the North to the 
South. This portion is the most skilled-intensive in the South, and the most 
unskilled-intensive in the North. Hence, outsourcing increases relative skill demand and 
wage inequality in both countries. Similarly, Zhu (2004), and Zhu and Trefler (2005) 
argue that if the North loses competitiveness in unskilled-intensive products, a process 
of technology transfer is induced, where the production of unskilled-intensive goods is OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  3 
relocated to the South. The relocated goods are the most skilled-intensive by Southern 
standards. This Southern catching-up raises the relative demand for skilled workers and 
thus exacerbates wage inequality. Yeaple (2003) demonstrates that in skill-scarce labor 
host countries, the flows of foreign direct investment by U.S.-based multinational 
companies are concentrated in low-skilled industries, whereas in skill-abundant labor 
host countries, the flows of foreign direct investment are concentrated in high-skilled 
industries. In theory, this can cause the skill premium to decrease in the former and to 
increase in the latter. 
Xu (2003) shows that in a framework, where there are non-traded goods whose 
range is endogenously determined by the level of trade barriers, a tariff reduction causes 
an expansion in the South’s import range, which increases the demand for skilled 
workers in the North. This causes an increase in the North’s skilled labor cost, which 
leads the South to expand its export range as well. The increase in the export ranges of 
both countries leads to an increase in skill demand and wage inequality. In addition, 
Beaulieu et al. (2004) present a model in which a reduction of trade barriers within the 
high-tech sector can raise the demand for these products in both countries, increase the 
demand for skilled labor, and thus increase wage inequality. 
Other studies argue that trade induces skill-biased technological change. Acemoglu 
(2002, 2003) shows that trade creates a tendency for the relative price of skill-intensive 
goods to increase in the North. This makes the technologies used in the production of 
these goods more profitable to develop and encourages skill-biased technological change, 
which contributes to the increase in wage inequality. Since the South imitates the 
Northern technologies that are becoming more skill-biased, it experiences an increase in 
the skill premium as well. Thoenig and Verdier (2000) argue that when globalization 
triggers an increased threat of technological leapfrogging, firms respond by biasing the 
direction of their innovations towards skill-intensive technologies. In a model where 
only the North innovates and the South imitates, openness causes defensive skill-biased 
technical change in the North, and technical upgrading in the production of the imitated 
goods in the South to more skill-intensive ones. This generates an increase in wage 
inequality in both the North and the South. 
Nevertheless, as much as these studies provide insights on the factors generating an 
increase in the skill premium in both the North and the South, they do not address the 
asymmetry of the response of the skill premium to trade openness among developing 
countries. The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative explanation for the 
asymmetric patterns of skill premia observed, using the theory of task trade. In this 
context, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2007, 2008a, 2008b) argue that advances in 
communication and information technologies have enabled the break-up of the 
production process into tasks, where the performance of these tasks is spread across the 
world. Therefore, international trade is becoming less a matter of countries’ 
specialization in particular industries, and more about their specialization in particular 
tasks. 
This paper develops a model of trading tasks between two countries: the North and SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  4 
the South, as in Khalifa and Mengova (2010). The North is more skill-abundant 
compared to the South. Firms in both countries produce a low-skilled intensive good and 
a high-skilled intensive good. There are two factors of production: low-skilled workers 
and high-skilled workers. The production of a unit of either good involves a continuum 
of L-tasks and a continuum of H-tasks. The L-tasks can be performed by low-skilled 
workers only, and the H-tasks can be performed by high-skilled workers only. If a task is 
performed offshore, the firm bears an extra cost of coordinating production and 
communicating with distant workers. This cost varies by task, as some require 
face-to-face contact or interaction between workers, while others are easier to perform 
from a distance. In this context, there exists a threshold L-task and a threshold H-task in 
every industry, below which all tasks are offshored to the South, and above which all 
tasks are produced in the headquarters in the North. In the South, some of the 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers supply their labor to the firms that serve as an 
external provider of a task to the Northern firms. Accordingly, the wages of the 
high-skilled and the low-skilled workers are a weighted average of the higher wage of 
those working in the offshoring firms, and of the lower wage of those hired by local 
producers in the South. 
The results suggest that there is a threshold skill abundance level in the South. 
Countries with skill abundance above this threshold, are relatively more endowed with 
high-skilled workers. The Northern firms offshore their H-tasks to these countries to 
benefit from the relatively lower labor cost. This means that a higher proportion of the 
high-skilled workers in the South will be earning the higher wage, and the increase in 
their proportion causes an increase in the weighted average wage of the high-skilled 
workers, and accordingly an increase in the skill premium. Countries with skill 
abundance below this threshold, are relatively more endowed with low-skilled workers. 
The Northern firms offshore their L-tasks to these countries to benefit from the relatively 
lower labor cost. Therefore, a higher proportion of the low-skilled workers in the South 
will be earning the higher wage, and the increase in their proportion causes an increase 
in the weighted average wage of the low-skilled workers, and accordingly a decrease in 
the skill premium. 
Consequently, in the South, countries that are more (less) skill-abundant, will have a 
lower (higher) cost of offshoring services for skilled tasks. The North offshores the 
high-skilled tasks to countries that are relatively more abundant in high-skilled workers, 
and low-skilled tasks to countries that are relatively more abundant in low-skilled 
workers. As a result, countries that become the hosts of low-skilled tasks will have a 
decrease in the skill premium, while those that become the hosts of the high-skilled tasks 
will have an increase in their skill premium, after an improvement in the offshoring 
technology. This provides a possible explanation for the asymmetric patterns of skill 
premia in the South. Our results also suggest that the threshold skill abundance becomes 
lower with an improvement in the technology of offshoring all tasks in the low-skilled 
intensive industry, than with an improvement in the technology of offshoring all tasks in 
the high-skilled intensive industry. If the wages in local production catch up with wages OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  5 
in the offshoring sector, then any improvement in the technology of offshoring will not 
impact the skill premium at a certain level of skill abundance. 
An empirical analysis is undertaken to test our theoretical results using the threshold 
estimation techniques introduced by Hansen (1999) on a sample of 29 developing 
countries over the period 1982-2000. The empirical results suggest the presence of a 
statistically significant skill abundance threshold, below which the coefficient estimate 
of the relationship between offshoring and wage inequality is negative, and above which 
there is no impact of offshoring on wage inequality. Similar results are reached if we 
replace the level of offshoring with variables that proxy for the offshoring technology. 
Our estimation also supports the hypothesis that the threshold estimate in the case of 
offshoring tasks in the high-skilled intensive industry is higher than that in the 
low-skilled intensive industries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model, 
section 3 includes the empirical estimation, section 4 is the conclusion, section 5 




2.  MODEL 
 
Our model presents two countries: the North and the South. Firms in the two 
countries produce a low-skilled intensive good and a high-skilled intensive good using 
two factors of production: low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers. The North is 


















, where H is the supply of 
high-skilled workers in the North, while L is the supply of low-skilled workers in the 
North. Similarly, 
* H  is the supply of high-skilled workers in the South, while 
* L  is 
the supply of low-skilled workers in the South. 
In the North, firms can produce two goods, X and Y, with constant returns to scale. 
The production of a unit of either good involves a continuum of L-tasks and a continuum 
of H-tasks. We normalize the measure of tasks in each industry to one. The L-tasks can 
be performed by low-skilled workers only, while the H-tasks can be performed by 
high-skilled workers only. In any industry, the task that can be performed by a given 
factor requires similar amounts of that factor when performed at home. Industries may 
differ in their factor intensities. If a production technology allows no substitution 
between factors or tasks, each task must be performed at a fixed intensity in order to 
produce a unit of output. In industry X, a firm needs  LX a  units of the low-skilled 
workers to perform a typical L-task once, and  HX a   units of the high-skilled workers to 
perform a typical H-task once. Since the measure of L-tasks and H-tasks is normalized to 
one,  LX a  is the total amount of low-skilled workers and  HX a  is the total amount of 
high-skilled workers, that would be needed to produce a unit of good X in the absence of SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  6 
any offshoring. In industry Y, a firm needs  LY a  units of the low-skilled workers to 
perform a typical L-task once, and  HY a  units of the high-skilled workers to perform a 
typical H-task once. Since the measure of L-tasks and H-tasks is normalized to one,  LY a  
is the total amount of low-skilled workers and  HY a  is the total amount of high-skilled 
workers, that would be needed to produce a unit of good Y in the absence of any 











Firms can undertake these tasks in the North, or offshore them to be performed in the 
South. Since some tasks are more difficult to offshore than others, we recognize the 
differences in terms of input requirements. A firm producing good j that offshores the 
f-task i abroad requires  ) (i t a fj fj fj β   units of labor in the South,  ) , , , ( HY LY HX LX fj∈ ∀ . 
fj β  is a parameter that reflects the technology of offshoring. A decline in  fj β  
represents the ease to offshore a given task abroad, and is equivalent to a decrease in the 
cost of offshoring.  ) (i t fj  reflects improvements in the technology of offshoring that 
differs across the i tasks. We assume that  ) (i t fj  is continuously differentiable and that 
1 ) ( ≥ i t fj fj β ,  fj ∀ , and  0 ) ( ≥ ′ i t fj . 
Let w be the wage of low-skilled workers in the North, 
* w  be the wage of the 
low-skilled workers hired to perform offshored L-tasks in the South, and 
* * w  be the 
wage of the remaining low-skilled workers engaged in local production in the South. Let 
s be the wage of high-skilled workers in the North, 
* s  be the wage of the high-skilled 
workers hired to perform offshored H-tasks in the South, and 
* * s  be the wage of the 
remaining high-skilled workers engaged in local production in the South. We also assume 
that 
* ) 0 ( w t w LX LX β > , 
* ) 0 ( w t w LY LY β > , 
* ) 0 ( s t s HX HX β >  and 
* ) 0 ( s t s HY HY β > , such 
that it is profitable for the North to conduct some tasks in the South. Thus, the Northern 
firms offshore tasks in order to take advantage of the lower wages in the South. In each 
industry, the marginal task performed in the North is determined by the condition that 
the savings in the wage costs just balance the offshoring costs as follows 
 
* ) ( w I t w LX LX LX β = ,                                                   ( 1 )  
 
* ) ( w I t w LY LY LY β = ,                                                   ( 2 )  
 
* ) ( s I t s HX HX HX β = ,                                                   ( 3 )  
 
* ) ( s I t s HY HY HY β = ,                                                   ( 4 )  OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  7 
where  fj I   is the threshold task, below which all f-tasks in the production of good j are 
offshored to the South, and above which all f-tasks are produced in the headquarters in 
















Offshore to the South Headquarters in the North
Offshore to the South Headquarters in the North
Offshore to the South Headquarters in the NorthSHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  8 
In a competitive economy, the price of any good is less than or equal to the unit cost of 
production, with equality whenever a positive quantity of the good is produced. The unit 
cost of good j is the sum of the wages paid to the Northern low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers, and the wages paid to the Southern low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
Accordingly, the price of good X is given by 
 
∫ ∫ + − + + − =
HX LX I
HX HX HX HX HX
I




* ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( β β . (5) 
 
Similarly, the price of good Y is given by 
 
∫ ∫ + − + + − =
HY LY I
HY HY HY HY HY
I




* ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( β β ,  (6) 
 
where the first term in both equations is the labor cost of the low-skilled workers 
performing L-tasks in the headquarters in the North, the second term is the labor cost of 
the low-skilled workers performing offshored L-tasks in the South, the third term is the 
labor cost of the high-skilled workers performing H-tasks in the headquarters in the 
North, and finally the fourth term is the labor cost of the high-skilled workers 
performing offshored H-tasks in the South. Substituting (1) and (3) into (5) yields 
 


























+ − = Ω .  
Similarly, substituting (2) and (4) into (6) yields 
 


























+ − = Ω . 
The assumption that  0 ) ( > ′ i t fj  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i  implies that  1 ) ( < Ω fj fj I  for 
0 > fj I , which means that offshoring reduces the wage bill in proportion to the cost of 
performing the f-tasks at home, as long as some tasks are performed abroad. The 
improvement in the offshoring technology of the f-task in industry i is reflected in the 
decline of  fj β , or  0 < fj β . OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  9 
Next, we consider the factor markets in the North. The markets for low-skilled and 
high-skilled labor clear when employment by the two industries in the tasks performed 
in the North exhausts the factor supply. The labor market clearing conditions in the 
North are given by 
 
L Y I a X I a LY LY LX LX = − + − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ,                                       ( 9 )  
 
H Y I a X I a HY HY HX HX = − + − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ,                                    ( 1 0 )  
 
where X and Y denote the outputs of the two industries, respectively. 
We assume that 
* ) 0 ( w t w LX LX > β , 
* ) 0 ( w t w HX HX > β , 
* ) 0 ( s t s LY LY > β  and 
* ) 0 ( s t s HY HY > β , which guarantee that the South does not offshore to the North, as it 
would be too expensive for the South to pay the Northern wages. Taking into 
consideration the offshoring decisions made by firms in the North, the number of the 
Southern low-skilled workers engaged in local production in the South, 















* * ) ( ) ( β β .                           ( 1 1 )  
 
Similarly, the number of the Southern high-skilled workers engaged in local 
production in the South, 















* * ) ( ) ( β β ,                        ( 1 2 )  
 
where ) (
* * l L −  is the number of Southern low-skilled workers performing the 
offshored  L-tasks for Northern firms, and  ) (
* * h H −  is the number of Southern 
high-skilled workers performing the offshored H-tasks for Northern firms. Figures 3 and 
4 show the division of low-skilled and high-skilled labor in the South between those 
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Figure 3.    Division of Low-skilled Labor in the South between 
* l   Engaging in Local 
Production in the South, and  ) (




Figure 4.    Division of High-skilled Labor in the South between 
* h   Engaging in Local 
Production in the South, and  ) (




As in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008b), firms in the South must pay a small 
extra cost to acquire the capability to serve as an external provider of a task.
1 Assume 
 
1  The literature distinguishes between vertical integration and outsourcing. Vertical integration is a form 
of business organization in which all stages of production of a good, from the acquisition of raw materials to 
the retailing of the final product, are controlled by one company. According to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2008b), they “do not address the choice between vertical integration and outsourcing. Instead, we assume 
that firms use the same technology when performing tasks for themselves as when performing them for others. 
Moreover, firms must pay a small extra cost to acquire the capability to serve as an external provider of a 
task. In equilibrium, no firm has any incentive to pay this cost, so all tasks are performed in-house.”  
Therefore, outsourcing can not occur in such an equilibrium. However, we assume that firms in the North are 
willing to cover this cost as long as their total cost of procuring the task from the South is less than their total 
cost of producing it in their headquarters in the North. This provides an incentive for firms in the South to 
perform offshoring services to Northern firms. If this payment is reflected in an increase in the wage of the 




l* Local Production Offshored L -tasks
0 H*
h* H* - h*
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the wage of the low-skilled workers hired to perform offshored L-tasks in these firms is 
* w , while that of the remaining low-skilled workers engaged in local production in the 
South is 
* * w , where 
* * * w w ≥ ,
2 then the weighted average wage of the low-skilled 
workers, 
S




































= .                           ( 1 3 )  
 
Similarly, assume the wage of the the high-skilled workers hired to perform 
offshored H-tasks in these firms is 
* s , while that of the remaining high-skilled workers 
engaged in local production is 
* * s , where 
* * * s s ≥ , then the weighted average wage of 
the high-skilled workers, 
S
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We will consider the case when 
* * * w w > , and 
* * * s s > , and then we will analyze 
the case when wages in local production catch up with wages in the offshoring sector, 
such that 
* * * w w = , and 
* * * s s = . 
 
incentive for workers in the South to supply their labor to Southern firms providing offshoring services. 
Therefore, outsourcing can take place in equilibrium. 
2 Our assumption that the wages of workers in local production in the South are lower than the wages of 
workers in the offshoring sector is based on the findings in Sethupathy (2009) who shows that “following a 
new offshoring opportunity, offshoring firms increase their productivity and profitability at the expense of 
non-offshoring firms. This channel leads to higher domestic wages at offshoring firms and lower domestic 
wages at non-offshoring firms.” This assumption is also based on the evidence shown in Aitken et al. (1996) 
that Southern workers employed in multinational corporations earn higher wages on average compared to 
workers employed by domestic firms. SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  12 
Proposition 1.  If 
* * * w w > , and 













, below which an improvement in the technology of offshoring  ) 0 ( < β d 
causes a decrease in the skill premium in the South, and above which the improvement 
in the technology of offshoring  ) 0 ( < β d   causes an increase in the skill premium in the 
South. 
 
Proof.  Included  in  appendix  2.1■ 
 
This result provides a possible explanation for the asymmetric patterns of skill 
premia after trade openness among developing countries. The threshold skill abundance 
is displayed in figure 5. The intuition for the existence of this threshold is 
straightforward. Developed countries offshore their H-tasks to developing countries that 
are high-skilled abundant to benefit from the relatively lower labor cost. This means that 
more high-skilled workers in the South will be involved in performing offshored H-tasks 
for firms in the North. As their wage is higher than the wage of the remaining 
high-skilled workers in the South, the increase in the proportion of the high-skilled 
workers performing offshored tasks leads to an increase in their weighted average wage, 
and accordingly an increase in the skill premium. On the other hand, developed 
countries offshore their L-tasks to developing countries that are low-skilled abundant to 
benefit from the relatively lower labor cost. This means that more low-skilled workers in 
the South will be involved in performing offshored L-tasks for firms in the North. As 
their wage is higher than the wage of the remaining low-skilled workers in the South, the 
increase in the proportion of the low-skilled workers performing offshored tasks leads to 
an increase in their weighted average wage, and accordingly a decrease in the skill 
premium. 
T L H ) / (
* *
0 ) / ( > ∂ ∂ β
S w 0 ) / ( < ∂ ∂ β
S w
 
Figure 5.    Threshold Skill Abundance in the South 
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Proposition 2.  If 
* * * w w = , and 
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) ( ) (
, below which an improvement in the technology of 
offshoring  ) 0 ( < β d  causes a decrease in the skill premium, while an improvement in 
the technology of offshoring  ) 0 ( < β d  does not affect the skill premium at this level of 














Proof.  Included  in  appendix  2.2■ 
 
In this case, when the wages in local production catch up with the wages in the 
offshoring sector, then any increase in offshoring activities due to an improvement in the 
technology of offshoring will not impact the skill premium at a certain level of skill 
abundance. 
 
Proposition 3.  If 
* * * w w > , and 













, below which the skill premium in the South decreases with an 
improvement in the technology of offshoring all tasks in the high-skilled intensive 
X-industry,  ) 0 ( < X dβ , and above which the skill premium increases in the South. (2) 












, below which the skill premium in the 
South decreases with an improvement in the technology of offshoring all tasks in the 
low-skilled intensive Y-industry,  ) 0 ( < Y dβ , and above which the skill premium 
























Proof.  Included  in  appendix  2.3■ 
 
This result is intuitive as well. An improvement in the offshoring technology of the 
high-skilled intensive X-industry, leads the North to offshore more H-tasks to produce 
good  X to the developing countries that are relatively high-skilled abundant, and 
offshore more L-tasks to produce good X to the developing countries that are relatively 
low-skilled abundant. Therefore, the relative increase in the demand for high-skilled 
workers in the former will cause an increase in the skill premium, while the relative SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  14 
increase in the demand for low-skilled workers in the latter will cause a decrease in the 
skill premium. The same scenario takes place with an improvement in the offshoring 
technology of all tasks in the low-skilled intensive Y-industry. However, the threshold in 
the last case is smaller than in the first case. This is because the increase in the 
proportion of the high-skilled workers performing offshored tasks in the Y-industry 
relative to the increase in the proportion of the low-skilled workers performing offshored 
tasks in the Y-industry is smaller than that in the X-industry. This follows from the 
assumption that the X-industry is more skill intensive than the Y-industry, and that the 
relative labor requirement of high-skilled workers performing offshored H-tasks to that 
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, will experience a decline in the skill premium after an improvement in the 












 will experience an increase in the skill premium. Similarly, developing 












, will experience a 
decrease in the skill premium after an improvement in the technology of offshoring all 












 will experience an 
increase in the skill premium. This also means that developing countries whose skill 
























 will experience a decrease in the skill 
premium after an improvement in the offshoring technology of all tasks in the X-industry, 
but will experience an increase in the skill premium after an improvement in the 
offshoring technology of all tasks in the Y-industry, as shown in figure 6. This is because 
the  Y-industry has a lower relative high-skilled to low-skilled labor requirement for 
offshoring, as opposed to the X-industry. Therefore, countries with a relatively lower 
skill abundance can attract more H-tasks with an improvement in the offshoring of all 
tasks in the Y-industry than with an improvement in the offshoring of all tasks in the 
X-industry. This explains the smaller threshold in the case of an improvement in the 
technology of offshoring tasks in the low-skilled intensive industry compared to the case 
of an improvement in the technology of offshoring tasks in the high-skilled intensive 
industry. 
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* *
0 ) / ( > ∂ ∂ X
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S w β
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* *
0 ) / ( > ∂ ∂ γ β
S w 0 ) / ( < ∂ ∂ γ β
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Figure 6.    Threshold Skill Abundance in the South with an Improvement in the 
Technology of Offshoring Tasks in the X-industry and the Y-industry 
 
 
Proposition 4.  If 
* * * w w = , and 
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3.  ESTIMATION 
 
In this section, we test empirically the relationship between offshoring and wage 
inequality in developing countries using threshold estimation techniques developed in 
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where the subscript i indexes the country, and the subscript i indexes time. The 
dependent variable  it premium  denotes the skill premium in country i in year t. The 
variable  it Offshoring  is a measure of offshoring, or U.S. foreign direct investment 
(FDI), in country i in year t. Offshoring is comprised of foreign direct investment and 
outsourcing. However, due to the lack of data on outsourcing (or the volume of 
subcontracted tasks), we focus our attention on FDI as a proxy for offshoring.
3 The 
variable  it Openess  is a measure of trade openness in country i in year t. The threshold 
variable  it Abundance  is a measure of skill abundance in country i in year t. The 
variable  it RGDP  denotes real gross domestic product per capita in country i in year t, 
and is added to control for macroeconomic developments which might impact wage 
inequality. In this context, the observations are divided into two regimes depending on 
whether the threshold variable  it Abundance  is smaller or larger than the threshold  σ . 
The regimes are distinguished by differing regression slopes,  1 β  and  2 β . Therefore, 
the threshold regression model allows the level of skill abundance to determine the 
existence and significance of a threshold level in the relationship between offshoring and 
wage inequality rather than imposing a priori an arbitrary classification scheme. The 
 
3 Offshoring measures a production process, where at least some part of it is performed abroad. The part 
of the production process performed abroad, could be either the result of FDI, which is directly measurable in 
the U.S. accounts, and constitutes the biggest proportion of offshoring, or alternatively, could be the result of 
arms-length trade, where a U.S. firm signs a contract with a local producer to perform a specific job, or a task. 
The latter is very difficult to account for, or to measure directly, since it does not enter directly into the U.S. 
balance of payments, and it constitutes a relatively small portion of the total offshoring. Therefore, studies in 
this line of research have resorted to using empirical proxies for offshoring, usually taking FDI as the closest 
possible substitute. Following Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Trefler (2006), we define offshoring to 
include the movement of production processes abroad, but kept within the firm (vertical FDI) as well as 
arms-length transactions. Sethupathy (2009) uses the same empirical methodology on U.S. FDI data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Mexican data, and recognizes the same restrictions on data availability. OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  17 
threshold skill abundance determines whether the coefficient on offshoring is positive or 
negative. According to the predictions of the model, the coefficient  1 β  is expected to 
be negative, while the coefficient  2 β   is expected to be either positive as in proposition 
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where (.) I  is the indicator function. A balanced panel annual data is used for 29 
developing countries over the period from 1982 to 2000. A Theil index of wage 
inequality, compiled by the University of Texas Inequality Project, is used as a measure 
of the skill premium. Total trade as a percentage of real GDP from the Penn World 
Tables 6.2 is used as a measure of trade openness. As in Forbes (2001), the average 
years of total education in the population aged over 15, from Barro and Lee data on 
educational attainment, is used as a measure of skill abundance. The United States direct 
investment abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is used as a proxy for 
offshoring. Finally, real GDP per capita is extracted from the Penn World Tables 6.2. 
Detailed data description is included in the appendix. Summary statistics of the variables 
used in the estimation are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1.    Summary Statistics (Offshoring Sample) 
  Minimum 25% quantile Median  75% quantile  Maximum 
Premiumit  0.0025 0.0334 0.0570 0.0827 0.2752 
RGDPit  888.5339 3810.1869 6145.9131 9423.0404 29433.7712 
Abundanceit  2.7632 4.8408 6.0474 7.4420 10.8370 
Opennessit  10.0020 51.2325 50.6465 109.9234 44.7677 
Offshoringit  0.0000 488.0000 1466.0000 3451.0000  39352.0000 
High Skilled Offshoringit  0.0000 22.0000 191.0000 883.0000  24062.0000 
Low Skilled Offshoringit  0.0000 210.0000 798.0000 2015.0000  19274.0000 
 
 
Table 2.    Summary Statistics (Offshoring Technology Sample) 
  Minimum  25% quantile  Median  75% quantile  Maximum 
Premiumit  0.0041 0.0374 0.0653 0.0910 0.2625 
RGDPit  1896.8130 4079.4902 6768.5475 10573.1715 29433.7712 
Abundanceit  3.1244 5.0864 6.3320 7.6402 10.8370 
Opennessit  15.1931 43.3355 76.3931 34.1383 44.7677 
Cellularit  0.0000 0.2878 1.3707 4.9365 81.7906 
Internetit  0.0000 0.0295 0.2802 1.6952 40.5037 SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  18 
To determine the number of thresholds, the model is estimated by least squares 
allowing for zero, one, two, and three thresholds. In Table 3, the test for a single 
threshold is significant with a bootstrap
4  p-value of 0.0267. On the other hand, the test 
for a double threshold is not significant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.9267. Similarly, 
the test for a triple threshold is not significant, with a bootstrap p-value of 0.9767. Thus, 
we conclude that there is evidence of only one threshold in the regression relationship. 
 
 
Table 3.    Tests for Threshold Effects for All Industries (Offshoring) 
 All  Industries 
Test for Single Threshold   
F1  92.1580 
p-value 0.0267 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (63.5645, 76.7147, 126.6712) 
Test for Double Threshold   
F2  7.2780 
p-value 0.9267 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (61.4921, 77.1760, 111.6403) 
Test for Triple Threshold   
F3  4.4730 
p-value 0.9767 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (32.9101, 38.6363, 55.7092) 
 
 
Table 4.    Tests for Threshold Effects for All Industries (Offshoring Technology) 
 Cellular  Internet 
Test for Single Threshold    
F1  78.7528 79.3166 
p-value 0.0400  0.0033 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (47.4166, 66.2353, 106.8829) (35.0886, 40.2593, 71.2809) 
Test for Double Threshold    
F2  33.6341 166.2206 
p-value 0.0200  0.0067 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (23.1061, 27.7534, 37.8847) (26.1759, 39.5219, 104.4489) 
Test for Triple Threshold    
F3  3.9316 6.5669 
p-value 0.6700  0.1933 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (13.3500, 17.0553, 21.8221) (9.2070, 12.9432, 20.5888) 
 
 
4 300 bootstrap replications are used for each of the three bootstrap tests. OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  19 
The point estimate of the threshold is 2.9964, and its asymptotic 99% confidence 
interval is [2.9964, 3.0752]. More information can be learned from plots of the 
concentrated likelihood ratio function displayed in Figure 7. To examine the first-step 
likelihood ratio function which is computed when estimating a single threshold model, 
we see that the first-step threshold estimate is the point where the likelihood function 
equals zero, which occurs at  9964 . 2 = σ . 
 
 
Table 5.    Tests for Threshold Effects for High-skilled and Low-skilled Industries 
 High-Skilled  Industries  Low-skilled  Industries 
Test for Single Threshold    
F1  89.8852 89.3219 
p-value 0.0333  0.0467 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (72.2670, 81.6811, 117.6502) (67.7671, 86.8367, 137.3502) 
Test for Double Threshold    
F2  29.9838 7.8094 
p-value 0.4133  0.9033 
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values)  (62.9321, 76.7009, 114.9622) (61.1903, 77.1844, 95.8895) 
Test for Triple Threshold    
F3  5.4520 5.1810 
p-value 0.8733  0.9500 




Figure 7.    Confidence Interval Construction in the Single Threshold Model for All Industries 
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The regression slope estimates, conventional OLS standard errors, and 
white-correlated standard errors are reported in Table 6. Real GDP per capita does not 
have any effect on wage inequality. Skill abundance has a significant positive impact on 
wage inequality with a coefficient of 0.0191. Trade openness also has a significantly 
positive coefficient with wage inequality as expected. The estimates of primary interest 
are those on offshoring. Offshoring has a significant negative effect on wage inequality 
with a coefficient of -0.0005, if skill abundance is below the first threshold 2.9964. On 




Table 6.    Regression Estimates for All Industries 
Regressor  Coefficient Estimate  OLS SE  White SE 
RGDPit  -0.000003*** 0.000001  0.000001 
Abundanceit  0.01914*** 0.00279  0.00209 
Opennessit  0.00010** 0.00007  0.00007 
OffshoringitI 
9964 . 2 ≤ it Abundance  
-0.00052*** 0.00006  0.00010 
OffshoringitI 
9964 . 2 > it Abundance  
-0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 
Observations=493  Sum of Squared Errors=0.2223 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
Instead of the level of offshoring, we use variables to proxy for the offshoring 
technology. Improvements in communication technology are changing the rules on what 
can be produced domestically versus abroad. Therefore, we use variables such as the 
number of internet users per 100 people, and the mobile cellular phone subscriptions per 
100 people, as proxies for improvements in offshoring technology. Offshoring is 
facilitated by the availability of cellular phones and wider access to the internet. In this 
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where OffshoringTechnologyit can be either the number of cellular phone subscribers or 
internet users, per 100 people, in country i in year t. The same sample of countries that is 
used in the previous analysis is utilized in this context, with the exception of Taiwan, 
over a shorter period from 1992 to 2000. Data description is included in the appendix. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in this estimation are provided in Table 2. Table OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  21 
4 shows the significance of two thresholds, whether we are using the cellular phone, or 
internet use, as a proxy for offshoring technology. Table 7 shows that cellular phone 
subscriptions have a significantly negative effect on the skill premium for countries with 
a level of skill abundance below the second threshold 3.4406, while the coefficient is 
insignificant above this threshold. Table 8 shows that internet use has a significantly 
negative effect on the skill premium for countries with a level of skill abundance below 
the second threshold 4.5230, while the coefficient is insignificant above this threshold. 
These results suggest that using variables that proxy for offshoring technology, instead 
of the level of offshoring, also support the findings in proposition 2. 
 
 
Table 7.    Regression Estimates for All Industries 
Regressor  Coefficient Estimate OLS SE  White SE 
RGDPit  0.000001 0.000002  0.000002 
Abundanceit  0.00297 0.00811  0.00798 
Opennessit  -0.00003 0.00013  0.00009 
CellularitI 
2984 . 3 < it Abundance  
0.30248*** 0.05648  0.12435 
CellularitI 
4406 . 3 2984 . 3 < ≤ it Abundance  
-0.08064*** 0.01529 0.04923 
CellularitI 
4406 . 3 > it Abundance  
-0.00004 0.00016  0.00008 
Observations=196  Sum of Squared Errors=0.0307 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
Table 8.    Regression Estimates for All Industries 
Regressor  Coefficient Estimate OLS SE  White SE 
RGDPit  0.000001 0.000002  0.000002 
Abundanceit  0.00773 0.00646  0.00709 
Opennessit  0.00001 0.00010  0.00008 
InternetitI 
3932 . 3 < it Abundance  
-1.74133*** 0.13357  0.16208 
InternetitI 
5230 . 4 3932 . 3 < ≤ it Abundance  
-0.23135*** 0.01754  0.03830 
InternetitI 
5230 . 4 > it Abundance  
-0.00003 0.00029  0.00013 
Observations=196  Sum of Squared Errors=0.0194 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
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Table 9.  Regression  Estimates  for High-skilled Industries 
Regressor  Coefficient Estimate  OLS SE  White SE 
RGDPit  -0.000004*** 0.000001  0.000001 
Abundanceit  0.01815*** 0.00265  0.00193 
Opennessit  0.00008 0.00008  0.00007 
OffshoringitI 
0752 . 3 ≤ it Abundance  
-0.00500*** 0.00055  0.00107 
OffshoringitI 
0752 . 3 > it Abundance  
0.000000 0.000001  0.000000 
Observations=493  Sum of Squared Errors=0.2237 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
Table 10.    Regression Estimates for Low-skilled Industries 
Regressor  Coefficient Estimate  OLS SE  White SE 
RGDPit  -0.000003*** 0.000001  0.000001 
Abundanceit  0.01947*** 0.00271  0.00198 
Opennessit  0.00010* 0.00007  0.00006 
OffshoringitI 
9964 . 2 ≤ it Abundance  
-0.00059*** 0.00007  0.00011 
OffshoringitI 
9964 . 2 > it Abundance  
-0.000001 0.000001  0.000000 
Observations=493  Sum of Squared Errors=0.2228 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 
Finally, we divide industries into high-skilled and low-skilled, in order to test 
empirically propositions 3 and 4. The classification of industries into high-skilled and 
low-skilled is provided in the data appendix, and in Tables 11 and 12. The threshold 
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where the the variable  it Offshoring Skilled High  is a measure the U.S. foreign direct 
investment in the high-skilled industries in country i in year t. In Table 5, the test for a OFFSHORING AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  23 
single threshold is significant with a bootstrap
5  p-value of 0.0333. On the other hand, 
the test for a double threshold is not significant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.4133. 
Similarly, the test for a triple threshold is not significant, with a bootstrap p-value of 
0.8733. Thus, we conclude that there is only one threshold in the regression relationship. 
 
 
Table 11.    High-skilled Industries Classification 
1982-1998 1999-2000 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment  Machinery 
Electrical Equipment, Appliances and 
Components 
Electrical Equipment, Appliances and 
Components 
Transportation Equipment  Transportation Equipment 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate  Computer and Electronic Products 
Services Information 
Finance and Insurance 




Table 12.  Low-skilled  Industries  Classification 
1982-1998 1999-2000 
Petroleum Mining 
Food and Kindred Products  Food 
Chemical and Allied Products  Chemicals 













The point estimate of the threshold is 3.0752, and its asymptotic 99% confidence 
interval is [2.9964, 3.0752]. The concentrated likelihood ratio function is displayed in 
Figure 8. The regression slope estimates, conventional OLS standard errors, and 
white-correlated standard errors are reported in Table 9. Real GDP per capita does not 
have any effect on wage inequality. Skill abundance has a significant positive impact on 
wage inequality with a coefficient of 0.0181. Trade openness also has a significantly 
 
5 300 bootstrap replications are used for each of the three bootstrap tests. SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  24 
positive coefficient with wage inequality as expected. The estimates of primary interest 
are those on offshoring. Offshoring has a significant negative effect on wage inequality 
with a coefficient of -0.0050, if skill abundance is below the first threshold 3.0752. On 










Figure 9.    Confidence Interval Construction in the Single Threshold Model for 
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where the variable  it Offshoring Skilled Low  is a measure of U.S. foreign direct 
investment in the low-skilled industries in country i in year t. In Table 5, the test for a 
single threshold is significant with a bootstrap
6  p-value of 0.0467. On the other hand, 
the test for a double threshold is not significant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.9033. 
Similarly, the test for a triple threshold is not significant, with a bootstrap p-value of 
0.9500. Thus, we conclude that there is one threshold in the regression relationship. 
The point estimate of the threshold is 2.9964. The concentrated likelihood ratio 
function is displayed in Figure 9. The regression slope estimates, conventional OLS 
standard errors, and white-correlated standard errors are reported in Table 10. Real GDP 
does not have any effect on wage inequality. Skill abundance has a significant positive 
impact on wage inequality with a coefficient of 0.0195. Trade openness also has a 
significantly positive coefficient with wage inequality as expected. The estimates of 
primary interest are those on offshoring. Offshoring has a significant negative effect on 
wage inequality with a coefficient of -0.0006, if skill abundance is below the first 
threshold 2.9964. Offshoring has no impact on wage inequality if skill abundance is 
above the threshold. 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The 2x2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that trade openness induces countries to 
export the good that intensively uses the relatively abundant factor of production, and 
import the good that intensively uses the relatively scarce factor of production. 
Accordingly, skill-abundant developed countries are expected to export the good that 
intensively uses high-skilled workers. This leads to an increase in the relative price of 
the high-skilled intensive good, a rise in the relative demand for high-skilled workers, 
and consequently an increase in the skill premium. On the other hand, skill scarce 
developing countries are expected to export the good that intensively uses low-skilled 
workers. This leads to an increase in the relative price of the low-skilled intensive good, 
a rise in the relative demand for low-skilled workers, and consequently a decrease in the 
skill premium. Empirical evidence in several studies, however, demonstrates that 
 
6 300 bootstrap replications are used for each of the three bootstrap tests. SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  26 
although some developing countries have witnessed a declining skill premium, others 
have experienced a widening wage gap after trade liberalization. 
Our theoretical results show that there is a threshold skill abundance level in the 
South. Countries with skill abundance above this threshold, are relatively more endowed 
with high-skilled workers. The Northern firms offshore their H-tasks to these countries 
to benefit from the relatively lower labor cost. This means that a higher proportion of the 
high-skilled workers in the South will be earning the higher wage, and the increase in 
their proportion will cause an increase in the weighted average wage of the high-skilled 
workers, and accordingly an increase in the skill premium. Countries with skill 
abundance below this threshold, are relatively more endowed with low-skilled workers. 
The Northern firms offshore their L-tasks to these countries to benefit from the relatively 
lower labor cost. Therefore, a higher proportion of the low-skilled workers in the South 
will be earning the higher wage, and the increase in their proportion will cause an 
increase in the weighted average wage of the low-skilled workers, and accordingly a 
decrease in the skill premium. 
Consequently, in the South, countries that are more (less) skill abundant, will have a 
lower (higher) cost of offshoring services for skilled tasks. The North offshores the 
high-skilled tasks to countries that are relatively more abundant in high-skilled workers, 
and low-skilled tasks to countries that are relatively more abundant in low-skilled 
workers. As a result, countries that become the hosts of low-skilled tasks will have a 
decrease in the skill premium, while those that become the hosts of the high-skilled tasks 
will have an increase in their skill premium, after an improvement in the offshoring 
technology. This provides a possible explanation to the asymmetric patterns of skill 
premia in the South. Our results also suggest that the threshold skill abundance becomes 
lower with an improvement in the technology of offshoring all tasks in the low-skilled 
intensive industry, than with an improvement in the technology of offshoring all tasks in 
the high-skilled intensive industry. 
We test our findings empirically using the threshold estimation technique introduced 
by Hansen (1999) on a sample of 29 developing countries over the period 1982-2000. 
The results suggest the presence of a statistically significant skill abundance threshold, 
below which the coefficient estimate of the relationship between offshoring and wage 
inequality is negative, and above which there is no impact of offshoring on wage 
inequality. Similar results are reached if we replace the level of offshoring with variables 
that proxy for the offshoring technology. The estimation also supports the hypothesis 
that the threshold estimate in the case of offshoring tasks in the high-skilled intensive 
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Appendix 
 
1.  Data 
 
The estimation uses a balanced panel of annual data that covers the period from 1982 
to 2000 for 29 developing countries, namely: Argentina, Barbados, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
and Venezuela. The variables used in the estimation are described in detail as follows: 
 
1.1.  Skill  Premium 
 
The skill premium, or wage inequality, dataset used is compiled by the University of 
Texas Inequality Project. The original data comes from UNIDO statistics, which provide 
average manufacturing pay by industry. From these average industrial wages, a Theil 
index of inequality is calculated and used in this analysis as a measure of wage 
inequality. Detailed definition of this variable is included in Galbraith and Kum (2004). 
 
1.2.  Trade  Openness 
 
Trade openness data are extracted from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Exports plus 
Imports divided by real Gross Domestic Product GDP is the total trade as a percentage 
of GDP. This is the constant price equivalent of the total trade as a percentage of GDP. 
 
 
1.3.  Skill  Abundance 
 
Information on the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers is available for 
only a few countries, while data on educational attainment is widely available and 
relatively comparable across countries. Some studies suggest combining the data on 
educational attainment with observations on skill abundance to posit a relationship 
between these two variables and interpolate the relative supply of skilled workers for 
other countries. However, as Forbes (2001) argued that “this procedure is imprecise 
since the interpolation uses three points to draw two lines, and even these three points 
are of dubious accuracy and comparability.” Therefore, as a proxy for the relative supply 
of skilled labor, we use average years of total education in the population aged over 15 
years, as reported in Barro and Lee International Data on Educational Attainment. As the 
data is available only for the years 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 
2000, we use linear interpolation to derive the years-in-between. 
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1.4.    Real GDP per capita 
 
The data for real Gross Domestic Product per capita (Laspeyres) are extracted from 
the Penn World Tables 6.2, which is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, 
government expenditures and exports, and subtracting imports in any given year. The 
given year components are obtained by extrapolating the 1996 values in international 
dollars from the Geary aggregation using national growth rates. 
 
1.5.    U.S. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The United States foreign direct investment is extracted from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and defined as the United States direct investment abroad on a 
historical-cost basis, by country and industry in millions of U.S. dollars. The industries 
are divided into high-skilled and low-skilled according to the categorization in Tables 11 
and 12. 
 
1.6.  Offshoring  Technology 
 
We use the number of internet users (per 100 people), and the mobile cellular phone 
subscriptions (per 100 people), as proxies for the offshoring technology. This data is 
extracted from the World Development Indicators. 
 
 
2.  Derivations 
 
2.1.    Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Assume that 
* * * s s > , and 























































Assume that  β β β β β = = = = HY HX LY LX . Taking the derivative of 
S w  with 
respect to  β  yields 


















































































































































































, this means that as the offshoring technology improves  ) 0 ( < β d , the 
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which is true since we assumed 
* * * s s > . Therefore, the skill premium increases with 
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Below this threshold, skill abundance is lower than the threshold, and accordingly 
the right-hand side is lower than the left-hand side, and the condition (21) is satisfied, 





, and an improvement in the offshoring technology causes a decrease 
in the skill premium. Above the threshold, skill abundance is higher than the threshold 
and accordingly the right-hand side is higher than the left-hand side, and the condition 





, and an improvement in the offshoring technology 
causes an increase in the skill premium. 
 
2.2.    Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Assume that the wages in the local production catch up with those in the offshoring 
sector, such that 
* * * s s = , and 
* * * w w = . Assume also that  β β β β β = = = = HY HX LY LX . 
As in proposition 1, the derivative of 
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If 
* * * s s = , 
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Therefore, we can conclude that if 
* * * s s = , 
* * * w w = , and (24) are satisfied, any 
change in the technology of offshoring will not affect wage inequality at this level of 
























































































































































, and the skill premium declines after an 
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.                              ( 2 5 )  
 
since ) ( ) ( ) ( i t i t i t L LY LX = = , and  ) ( ) ( ) ( i t i t i t H HY HX = = , as we assumed  LY LX β β =  
β β β = = = HY HX . According to (25), the proportion of low-skilled workers engaged in 
offshoring activities amongst all low-skilled workers, is at most equal to the proportion 
of high-skilled workers engaged in offshoring activities amongst all high-skilled workers. 
This condition guarantees that there is a level of skill abundance, below which an 
improvement in the technology of offshoring causes a decrease in the skill premium, 
while offshoring does not affect the skill premium at this level. 
 
2.3.    Proof of Proposition 3 
 
























































Assume that  X HX LX β β β = = , and  Y HY LY β β β = = . The derivative of 
S w  with 
respect to  X β   is given by 





















































































































































































, this means that as the offshoring technology of the high-skilled 
intensive industry improves  ) 0 ( < X dβ , the skill premium in the South declines. This 
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below which the skill premium in the South declines with an improvement in the SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  36 
technology of offshoring all tasks in the high-skilled intensive industry, and above which 
the skill premium increases. Similarly, the derivative of 























































































































































































, this means that as the offshoring technology of the low-skilled 
intensive industry improves  ) 0 ( < Y dβ , the skill premium in the South declines. This 
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below which the skill premium in the South declines with an improvement in the 
technology of offshoring all tasks in the high-skilled intensive industry, and above which 
the skill premium increases. 








































means that the gap between the labor requirement for all H-tasks and all L-tasks in the 
high-skilled intensive industry is higher than that in the low-skilled intensive industry. 
This means that the second term in the right-hand side in (26) is smaller than that in the 
right-hand side in (27). This also means that the equalities that determines the two 







































2.4.    Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Assume that 
* * * s s = , and 
* * * w w = . Assume also that  X HX LX β β β = = , and 
Y HY LY β β β = = . As in proposition 3, the derivative of 
S w   with respect to  X β  is  zero 
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.                                                ( 2 8 )  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that if 
* * * s s = , 
* * * w w = , and (28) are satisfied, any 
change in offshoring of tasks in the high-skilled intensive good will not affect wage 












. As in proposition 2, 
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Similarly, the derivative of 
S w  with  respect  to  Y β   is zero if and only if 
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Therefore, we can conclude that if 
* * * s s = , 
* * * w w = , and (29) are satisfied, any 
change in offshoring of tasks in the low-skilled intensive good will not affect wage SHERIF KHALIFA AND EVELINA MENGOVA  40 












. As in proposition 2, 
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